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INTRODUCTION
Local government law scholarship has a “law and ___” problem. It
should be relatively uncontroversial to note that, over the last forty
years, most fields of legal scholarship have been profoundly
transformed by the incorporation of the tools and analytical methods
used in economics, political science, and other social scientific
disciplines. Local government law has not been immune. It is not
hard to find in local government law scholarship discussions of
concepts drawn from economics and political science, as well as from
a host of other disciplines. What is notable, and what I will show in
this Essay, is that these references are, for the most part, extremely
dated.
Specifically, I will argue that local government law has not kept up
with the intellectual movements that have defined the last twenty or
so years in the study of cities or politics. I will focus on the two areas
of social science that have been among the most important influences
on legal scholarship generally: economics and positive political
science. But as I will discuss in the conclusion, the same point could
be made with respect to other social scientific disciplines. Our field
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has had many successes, but it is being held back by a failure to keep
up with contemporary social science.
The Essay is divided into three parts. Part I addresses local
government law’s interaction with economics. In local government
law scholarship that deals with economic issues, there is frequent
discussion of the work of Charles Tiebout, who showed in the 1950s
that under certain assumptions, if local governments provide purely
local public services and individuals are mobile and able to choose
among local governments in an area, local public services will be
provided at an efficient level.1 But, although there have been many
advances in the use of the Tiebout model through the years, and
useful criticisms of it,2 it is far from the only economic model relevant
to cities or local government law. But until very recently at least,
scholars failed to notice a revolution in urban economics, specifically
research on agglomeration economics.3
Agglomeration economics focuses on why cities exist in the first
place, given the higher rents for property in urban areas.4 Scholars
working in this field argue that urban residents pay higher rents, but
receive gains from reduced shipping costs, increased market size, and
information spillovers.5 Changes in the form of these gains can
explain major changes in urban form, or the gains from public
policies. Agglomeration economics has become the dominant tool for
understanding the effect of changes in land use and other local
policies.6 But while other fields incorporated the newest things in

1. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in
Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503 (1997) (“The dominant law and
economics model of local government, based on the work of Charles M. Tiebout,
assumes that decentralization of power to local governments promotes the efficient
delivery of public goods and services.”); David Schleicher, The City as a Law and
Economic Subject, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (2010) (“The study of the
relationship between local government law and economics has long had one central
text: Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.”).
2. See infra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 32–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of research in
agglomeration economics and the limited degree it has been incorporated into legal
scholarship.
4. For a literature review of contemporary work in agglomeration economics,
see Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1515–29.
5. See Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Mare, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON.
316, 316–19 (2001); Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1522–23.
6. See EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL
EQUILIBRIUM 1–12 (2010) (discussing agglomeration economics and spatial
equilibrium as key insights of economics for studying cities).
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economic research—from antitrust’s embrace of industrial
organization theory to behavioral economics’ influence throughout
the legal academy7—advances in urban economics have largely been
absent from local government scholarship.
Part II discusses local government law’s interaction with political
science and finds similar problems to the ones discussed in Part I.
One can find discussion in local government law scholarship of work
in political science on growth machines, “city limits,” regime theory,
and pluralism, some of the dominant methodologies in urban politics
studies since the middle of the last century.8 But there is almost no
discussion of positive political theory, rational choice models of
legislative behavior, models of political party organization and
competition, empirical research on voting and legislative behavior, or
any of the other moves that have characterized the last few decades of
political science.9 Here the problem is not only in legal scholarship,
but also in the urban politics sub-discipline of political science, which
one scholar has called a “black hole” for its own refusal to use
contemporary methodologies.10
But problems in urban politics research should not stand in the way
of local government law scholars using the tools of modern political
7. See Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the
Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 1, 1–5 (2009)
(discussing influence of Chicago and Post-Chicago Schools of industrial organization
economics on antitrust law and scholarship); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
Ginsberg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws and Implications
for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1036–66 (2012) (discussing the rise of
behavioral economics and the related rise of behavioral law and economics).
8. The classic citations for each of these theories are ROBERT DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS? 329–43 (1961) (explaining New Haven politics as a relatively open forum
in which competing interests on different issues collectively make policy); JOHN R.
LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLACE 262 (1987) (developing the theory of “growth machine” cities); PAUL
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 31–65, 150–66 (1981) (arguing that the threat of residents
leaving in the face of efforts to redistribute wealth limits the policy options and
shapes the politics inside cities); CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS:
GOVERNING ATLANTA 1946–88 (1989) (explaining Atlanta politics as the product of a
“regime” of downtown business elites that incorporated black leaders into their
public and private sector governing apparatus).
9. See infra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dominance of
formal modeling and empirical work in modern political science (and reaction to it
among some political scientists).
10. See Joshua Sapochine et al., Is Urban Politics a Black Hole? Analyzing the
Boundary Between Political Science and Urban Politics, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 76 (2007)
(arguing that methodologies commonly used throughout the rest of political science
have not been employed in urban politics research and that the methods and findings
of urban politics scholars have not had much influence with other political scientists).
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science.
While local government law scholars have focused
substantially on questions of the power of exit by residents and the
benefits of different forms of institutional design—both of voting
systems and governmental form—Part II will argue that there has
been too little focus on studying the incentives of local officials or
strategic interaction between such officials inside existing
governmental structures. Similarly, when discussing whether power
should be allocated to local or state legislatures, or how regional
governments should be structured (if at all), local government law
scholars have largely ignored research on how local officials get
elected and how local party systems work. Also, very little empirical
work has been done on how local political systems or legislatures
operate. Again, this is in contrast to other fields of legal scholarship,
like statutory interpretation, administrative law, and constitutional
law, which have all substantially incorporated and influenced work in
contemporary political science.11
Part III will expand the scope of the discussion to other social
sciences. Research into cities is booming in a whole variety of fields,
particularly in economics, but also in fields ranging from criminology
to the “science of cities.”12 But with a few exceptions, local
government law scholars have not used these findings or
methodological approaches. Our failure to incorporate the best work
by other types of scholars has been harmful to the field. Ignoring
contemporary trends in the social sciences has left the field on the
11. Particularly in the areas of statutory interpretation and administrative law, it
is hard to understate the influence these approaches have had on legal scholarship.
For discussions and examples of the influence of positive political theory on statutory
interpretation, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political
Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 461 (1992); McNollgast, Legislative Intent:
The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive

Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1431-32 (2003). For discussions
and examples of the use of positive political theory in administrative law, see
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 180 (1999); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of
Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal
Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008); Barry R. Weingast
& Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983). In
constitutional law, see Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle
of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 662 (2011); Jide O. Nzelibe &
Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers,
Rational Voting and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617 (2010).
12. See infra notes 66–88 and accompanying text.
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margin of mainstream legal academic thought, even though many
important contemporary legal debates have a substantial local
government law component.13
But more importantly, our failure to integrate modern work in the
social sciences into local government law has been bad for public and
scholarly debate about cities and local governance. As local
government law scholars, we have a great deal to add to these
debates, as work by social scientists frequently fails to acknowledge
or deal adequately with the institutions and legal processes through
which public policy in cities is made. But we will only be able to add
to these debates if we understand them. The first step to making our
field more analytically interesting and practically useful is admitting
we have a problem. A “law and ___” problem.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW AND URBAN ECONOMICS
At a conference full of local government law scholars, one need not
spend too much time explaining the Tiebout Model. Tiebout argued
that, under certain assumptions, local policy outputs will be provided
at the efficient level: that is, the amount and kind of local public
services and taxes would match residents’ preferences.14 Individuals
will choose where to live among many local governments in a region
based on their local policies, and this sorting process will result in a

13. For instance, there is extensive literature discussing the huge prison
population in the United States. Despite the fact that crime is investigated and
deterred by local officials (police officers) and largely prosecuted by local officials
(district attorneys), most discussions of mass incarcerations have until very recently
ignored any discussion of the types of questions that animate local government law,
like whether local officials have the right incentives, whether there are externalities
to local governmental behavior or the effects of putting the onus of taxation on local
communities. See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the State’s Dime): How
Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why
It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 992–93 (2012) (finding that the fact that states
pay for prison while county district attorneys prosecute crimes leads to excessive
punishment in California, and noting that the literature has ignored counties’
contribution to over incarceration); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply
Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1106–07 (2013)
(reviewing ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011)) (discussing how a leading study of
incarceration does not even address in passing the role played by local officials in
generating mass incarceration); see also infra notes 91–101 for a discussion of how
criminal law scholars have begun to focus on problems in local government law as an
explanation for changes in crime rates without local government law scholars
discussing the issue frequently.
14. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 416–20 (1956).

SCHLEICHER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1956

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

11/12/2013 11:29 PM

[Vol. XL

good fit between policies and voter preferences.15 Bruce Hamilton
and Wallace Oates fleshed out Tiebout’s model, explaining and
providing empirical support for the claim that the quality of public
policies will be capitalized into property values, and showing how the
model has no equilibrium if property taxes are used but there is no
zoning (and thus providing a justification local zoning power).16 Bill
Fischel provided the model with a “supply side,” arguing that local
homeowners are intensely worried about variation in the value of
their home, and thus have an incentive to get involved in politics, to
ensure that local governmental officials do not cause prices to fall by
driving people out. 17 Fischel thus made “voice” speak in the same
language as exit, and provided a story why certain powers—property
taxation, zoning and schools—were traditionally allocated to local
governments.18
The Tiebout Model has been heavily incorporated into local
government law, with scholars like Vicki Been, Lee Fennell, Chris
Serkin and many others using Tieboutian arguments to understand
the costs and benefits of land use policies, takings by cities, and other
local governmental policies.19 The Tiebout Model has also been
heavily criticized by a variety of scholars, including Gerry Frug, who
object to its assumption that local government services can or should
be understood as a consumption good, and a host of others for failing
to consider limits on mobility, inter-local externalities or
distributional effects.20 In his opus Our Localism, Richard Briffault
15. See id.
16. See William A. Fischel, Introduction to THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY:
ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 1, 4–18 (William A.
Fischel ed., 2006) (describing the development of the Tiebout model); Bruce W.
Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB.
STUD. 205 (1975); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public

Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and The
Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969).
17. Fischel, supra note 16, at 14–18.
18. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE
POLICIES 8 (2001); Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE
OATES 21, 32 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
19. See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521 (1991); Lee
Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale
of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883 (2007).
20. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 167–73 (1999) (critiquing Tiebout for treating city services as being
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argued that Frug’s approach to cities, rooted in participatory political
theory, and the Tiebout’s economic model provide two contrasting
“tales of the city.”21 It is relatively clear that when legal scholars talk
about the economic approach to local governments, they mean only
one thing: the Tiebout Model.
But the Tiebout Model is not, and has never been, the only
economic model about cities and local governments. Two stand out:
“mono-centric” models of cities and agglomeration economics. When
the field of local government law was consolidating in the 1970s and
early 1980s, urban economics was in a period of relative stasis,
focused on mono-centric models of cities that probably looked only
weakly descriptive to the scholars of the time if they were cognizant
of them. However, starting in the early 1990s, agglomeration models
took off, powered by mathematical innovation and the existence of
sufficient computing power to make them work.22 Associated with
leading scholars like Edward Glaeser, Paul Krugman, Robert Lucas,
and Paul Romer, this work exploded and turned out to be crucial to
many modern models of international trade and economic growth.23
Furthermore, it is extremely relevant to almost everything we as local
government law scholars talk about. Until roughly 2007, however,
there was little mention of it in the legal literature. Even though
there have now been several articles exploring the importance of
agglomeration to local government law, the dominant mode of urban
economics for the last twenty or so years has only made a small dent
in the field.

like a consumption good for residents); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest,
and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1991–2015 (2000) (criticizing Tiebout for failing to
consider distribution); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1824, 1834 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION,
SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001)) (criticizing the Tiebout model for
failing to consider externalities).
21. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 426–27 (1990).
22. See MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1–10 (1999).
23. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1515–28 (summarizing the work in the field);
see also Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 140 (1998);
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1127 (1992);
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3, 39 (1988); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 1002, 1006 (1986).
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In the 1970s, most urban economic work used models based on
the pioneering work of nineteenth century German economist Johann
Heinrich von Thünen.24 Von Thünen’s big insight was that, even
without planning, cities would take an organized form due to
competition among land users.25 Von Thünen showed that, if each
landowner decided what crops to plant based on the yield-per-acre of
different crops and the cost of transporting those crops to a centercity market, concentric rings of different crops would emerge around
the market.26 Land close to the market will be more expensive
because it is cheaper to send goods to market from that land, and
hence it will be used for high-yield and expensive-to-ship crops.27
Land uses should be less intense or productive as one gets further
from a city center, and unplanned competition will lead to a
minimization of the combined costs of transportation and
production.28 In the 1960s, scholars like William Alonso, Edward
Mills, and Richard Muth adapted this model to modern city forms,
suggesting that transportation costs drove where in cities people
located—skyscrapers in city centers, surrounded by apartments,
followed by dense suburbia, followed by exurbs and so on.29 These
“monocentric” models were the workhorses of urban economics of
the time.
However, although they yielded some powerful insights about the
relationship between methods of transportation and urban form,
these models must have seemed rather creaky in the 1970s and 80s,
when many of the classic pieces in local government law were
written.30 As cities adapted themselves to the fact that the car, which
can travel in any direction, replaced walking or trains as the dominant
24. See J.H. VON THÜNEN, THE ISOLATED STATE 110–13 (Peter Hall ed., Carla M.
Wartenberg trans., Pergamon Press 1966) (1826); see also FUJITA ET AL., supra note
22, at 15-17 (discussing the Von Thünen model).
25. THÜNEN, supra note 24, at 110–13.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. FUJITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 15–17 (describing Von Thünen’s findings).
29. See generally WILLIAM ALONSO, LOCATION AND LAND USE (1964); RICHARD
MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING (1969); Edwin S. Mills, An Aggregative Model of
Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 197 (1967).
30. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 429, 475–89 (1977); Gerald E. Frug, The City
as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); Frank I. Michelman, Political

Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977–1978); see also Ellickson, supra, at
425 (discussing what was known about the positive externalities of density but
acknowledges that knowledge at the time was “fragmentary”).
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method of transportation, the assumption of a single-central market
to which all goods were sent became increasingly problematic.
“Monocentric” models had difficulty explaining the changing fortunes
of center cities during the period, and they could not easily deal with
rapidly developing edge cities, tall office parks, and residential
centers far from traditional downtowns.31
In the late 1980s and 90s, however, work on agglomeration
economics took off. Building upon Alfred Marshall’s turn of the last
century insights,32 it started with a more fundamental question: why
do cities exist in the first place?33 The existence of cities cannot
simply be assumed, particularly because locating a business (or
buying an apartment) is more expensive in cities than in rural areas.34
For an economic model to explain why people and business would
move to cities, it needs to explain the gains resulting from locating in
urban areas that justify the higher costs. Marshall argued that there
were three sources of gains from urban agglomeration: reducing
shipping costs, the benefits of large markets, and information
spillovers.35 That is, people and businesses moved to make it easier to
participate in common markets.36 As Lucas later noted, “What can
people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not
for being near other people?”37 Up until the late 1980s, Marshall’s
insights had been extremely difficult for economists to model, largely
because any story about why cities develop necessarily involves
increasing returns to scale and non-linearity.38 As economics became

31. See GLAESER, supra note 6, at 44–50.
32. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 267–77 (8th ed. 1920).
33. See GLAESER, supra note 6, at 1 (“The foremost question of urban economics
is why cities exist.”); see also Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1516–28.
34. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J.
MONETARY ECON. 3, 38 (1988) (“If we postulate only the usual list of economic
forces, cities should fly apart. The theory of production contains nothing to hold a
city together. A city is simply a collection of factors of production—capital, people
and land—and land is always far cheaper outside cities than inside. Why don’t capital
and people move outside, combining themselves with cheaper land and thereby
increasing profits.”).
35. See MARSHALL, supra note 32, at 267–77; see also Schleicher, supra note 1, at
1516-28.
36. GLAESER, supra note 6, at 6 (“[A] way to understand agglomeration
economies is to go back to a fundamental definition of cities: the absence of physical
space between people and firms. Cities are density, proximity, closeness.”).
37. Lucas, supra note 34, at 39 (emphasis omitted).
38. FUJITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3–9; see PAUL KRUGMAN, DEVELOPMENT,
GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1–3 (1995).
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more rigorously mathematical, agglomeration economies were largely
ignored.
But in the late 1980s, new mathematical tools, such as Dixit-Stiglitz
constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, and cheaper
computing power made it easier to model agglomeration gains.39 Paul
Krugman, Anthony Venables, Masahisa Fujita and others focused on
how shipping costs can drive regional development, showing that
where shipping costs were real but not extremely high, producers of
intermediate goods (such as auto parts) would cluster near final goods
producers (such as auto manufacturers) to reduce shipping costs.40
Regions with easily obtainable input parts would then get more final
goods manufacturers. They found that city development is likely
heavily path-dependent.41 A history of development that led to many
input goods producers being in one region could lead to final good
producers staying in that region (to be close to those firms) even if
today’s transportation costs would not lead to the same grouping of
firms if location decisions were made entirely anew.42 But if transport
costs continued to fall, city economies could destabilize in ways that
cities would not recover from even if the fundamentals improved.
This helps explain much of the history of twentieth-century urban
areas, with manufacturing clustering in cities linked to the
transportation network (ports or railroad hubs).43 As shipping costs
fell with innovations like the combustion engine and shipping
container, the economies of cities that relied heavily on
manufacturing, like Detroit and Cleveland, held on for a while and
then quickly fell apart.44 However, as it became cheaper to move
goods around the country, shipping costs became relatively less
important as an explanation of urban success and failure in recent
years.45
The other stories have become important for understanding why
cities succeed. The existence of large labor markets provides
residents with opportunities to specialize, easier matching with
employers needing their skills, and insurance against the failure of
FUJITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
Id. at 9–10, 61–77; Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1517–20.
Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1520.
Id. at 1518–20.
Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, Did the Death of Distance
Hurt Detroit and Help New York?, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 303–05
(Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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their employers. An actor in Los Angeles can focus on being an
expert in playing a narrow type of role because there are enough
productions that feature that specialty, he can match with many
different movie studios and theaters until one works well, and he will
likely be able to find employment without having to move if his
employer goes bankrupt.46 On the other hand, an actor in Salt Lake
City will not see the same gains from specialization, matching, and
insurance against the failure of a single firm. The same dynamics
explain why certain retailers cluster, from bars to diamond sellers.47 It
even helps explain why unmarried people find cities particularly
attractive, as being in a deep dating market has the same
specialization, matching and insurance benefits.48
The final Marshallian category is perhaps the most important
today: information spillovers. People learn from informal discussions
with their neighbors, whether they are in the same industry or across
industries. People participating in these informal discussions become
more productive. Glaeser and David Maré, among others, have
shown that urban location improves wage growth: people who move
to cities develop skills and then see their wages grow.49 The result is
an “urban wage premium”—people in cities make much more money
due to their developing skills, and as a result, can pay the higher
rents.50 Modern theories of endogenous economic growth often turn
on human capital spillovers in cities.51 Information spillovers are
particularly important in today’s knowledge-based economy.
Technology companies pay top rents to be near other technology
companies, be they in Silicon Valley in the Bay Area or Silicon Alley
in New York.
46. Dan Rodriguez and I have used this example before. See Daniel B. Rodriguez
& David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 642–43
(2012).
47. Id. at 643.
48. Id.
49. See Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Maré, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON.
316, 316–19 (2001); Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1522. An excellent recent paper used
random lotteries for H1-B visas to test the effect of geography on wages and suggests
that there are large level effects from location. See Michael A. Clemens, The Effect

of International Migration on Productivity: Evidence from Randomized Allocation
of U.S. Visas to Software Workers at an Indian Firm 1, 10 (Ctr. for Global Dev.,
Working Paper, Dec. 3, 2012), available at www.aeaweb.org/aea/2013conference/
program/retrieve.php?pdfid=459. Clemens found that workers in the same Indian
firm that were sent to the U.S. instantly became more productive.
50. Glaeser & Maré, supra note 49, at 316.
51. That is, those that do not assume a level of technological growth, like the
famed Solow model. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1523–25.
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Agglomeration economics has become the dominant economic
approach to thinking about cities, and has been for quite a long time.
Until roughly five years ago, it was barely mentioned in local
government law scholarship. In recent years, however, there have
been a few papers that began exploring the importance of this work
for local governments and its interaction with the Tiebout Model.
For instance, Clay Gillette argued that, contrary to assumptions of
scholars using the Tiebout Model, local governments do engage in
substantial economic redistribution and that agglomeration
economies are likely the reason they are able to do so without
promoting exit by taxed residents.52 More generally, in my paper The
City as a Law and Economic Subject, I showed that Tiebout sorting
and agglomeration should have an inverse relationship.53 Strong
agglomeration economies can reduce the efficiency of sorting as they
make location decisions stickier, and extensive sorting reduces the
efficiency of agglomeration by changing the economically important
decision of where people would locate absent laws that condition the
receipt of a jurisdiction’s services on living in it.54 Work by Robert
Inman, Andrew Haughwout, and Rich Schragger have fleshed out
some other implications for local government law, from urban
development to contracts between cities and suburbs.55 Many of these
scholars—including Peter Byrne, Steve Eagle, Rick Hills, Gideon
Parchomovsky, Dan Rodriguez, Peter Seligman, and myself, have
focused on the myriad implications of this literature for land use law.56
52. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL
DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 74–105 (2011).
53. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1525–35.
54. Id.
55. See generally ANDREW F. HAUGHWOUT & ROBERT P. INMAN, HOW SHOULD
SUBURBS HELP THEIR CENTRAL CITIES? (2004) (discussing economic
interdependence of cities and suburbs as an argument for intercity contracts); David
Schleicher, I Would, but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Substantially
Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 281–84 (2011) (arguing strong
agglomeration gains in cities reduce the threat of exit and thus can help explain big
city political corruption); Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice
of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311 (2010) (arguing that local
economic development policies are largely futile).
56. See Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public
Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1070–74 (2011)
(using agglomeration economics to discuss issues in government takings); Roderick
M. Hills & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning To
Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262–67 (2010)
(discussing the effect of noncumulative zoning on agglomeration economies); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property and Positive Externalities, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2012); Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 46, at 637.
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As land use regulates where people locate inside cities, it clearly
affects how agglomeration economies develop.
However, this is still just the tip of the iceberg. Agglomeration
economics is not part of most of the major casebooks in the field,57
nor is it featured in much of the literature. There are dozens of local
government law articles each year that invoke the Tiebout Model.58
But, more than twenty years after agglomeration economics’
renaissance, there have been no more than a handful of papers
discussing agglomeration economics.59
It is particularly disappointing that agglomeration economics
provides local government law scholars with a third “tale of the
city.”60
Although extremely different, Frug’s approach to
understanding cities and the Tiebout Model—the two “views of the
city” discussed by Briffault—start from a common methodological
assumption that the creation of the local government or polity should
be where analysis begins.61 That is, both take as the unit of analysis
the local government (or system of local governments) and seek to
determine its/their success in providing goods or serving as a place to
engage in collective determination.62 Agglomeration economics starts
in a very different position. Cities arise on their own for reasons
unrelated to local governmental policies: people create market places,
build houses near one another, etc., and do so regardless of local
governmental form. Local governments can affect these location
decisions, either through regulations or by providing (or failing to
provide) attractive services or benefits. But people will move and
build cities regardless, as there is a market for physical location.
Local governments play a role much like administrative agencies do
in other markets: they are regulators of the location market.
This third “tale of the city” does not displace Frug or Tiebout’s
views of the city; it supplements them. Employing, engaging with,
and critiquing agglomeration economics would have legal scholars ask
an additional set of normative questions about how local government
57. One exception is LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 876 (3d ed. 2004), which includes a
discussion of Haughwout and Inman’s work.
58. A rough and ready Lexis search that included the names of leading scholars in
the field—Frug and Tiebout—came up with seventy-eight since 2007.
59. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
60. This argument was made in Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1545-55.
61. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 391 (1990).
62. Id. at 391–92.
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law should be judged, such as, “What market failures are there in the
location market?” “Are local regulations correcting these market
failures?” The harm that ignoring agglomeration economics has done
to local government law scholarship is substantial. We have not
focused enough on how local laws and systems of local government
impact the distribution of residents across the country, the efficiency
losses created by limiting entry through land use or simply by
encouraging Tiebout sorting, or how changes in the sources of
agglomeration gains over time have changed which types of cities
succeed and which policies work.
The failure of local government law scholars to incorporate
modern economic theory has also made policy discussions featuring
agglomeration economics arguments worse. For instance, there have
been many recent debates about the benefits of changing land use
laws, following Glaeser’s brilliant work revealing the cost of zoning
restriction in many metropolitan areas, and insightful books by
journalists like Matt Yglesias and Ryan Avent.63 But economic work
on the subject has not fully engaged with the legal processes through
which land use policy is made.64 Enrico Morretti recently released an
excellent and much discussed book using agglomeration economics to
examine the changing labor market in the U.S., but it features little
discussion of how labor law and local regulation affect the
development of regional economies.65 Legal scholars have much to
add to these debates, but can only do so if they engage with it. We
simply cannot go on imagining that the last word in the economic
study of local governments and cities is the Tiebout Model.

63. For just a taste of Glaeser’s work on zoning, see generally Edward L. Glaeser
& Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence
from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph
Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restriction on Housing Affordability, 9 FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21 (2003); Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko and
Raven Saks, Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up? 4–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11129, 2005); Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko &
Raven Saks, Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing
Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331 (2005); Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s
Steep Price, REGULATION, Fall 2002, at 24. For additional background, see generally
RYAN AVENT, THE GATED CITY (e-book, Amazon Digital Servs. 2011); MATTHEW
YGLESIAS, THE RENT IS TOO DAMN HIGH (e-book, Simon & Schuster 2012).
64. For an effort to do so, see David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J.
1670 (2013).
65. See generally ENRICO MORRETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012). In
an interesting recent article, Naomi Schoenbaum explored some of the labor law
implications of agglomeration economics. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility
Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1231–35 (2012).
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II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW AND POSITIVE POLITICAL
SCIENCE
Just as one can find discussions of traditional economic models in
local government law scholarship, one can find discussions of
traditional positive political science as well. (I am discussing positive
approaches, and notably not democratic theory, a subject that has
been much mined in the local government law literature.) The
leading approaches to studying city politics from twenty or thirty
years ago—Robert Dahl’s work on pluralism, Paul Peterson’s
Tiebout-style approach, Harvey Molotch’s scholarship claiming that
cities are “growth machines,” and Clarence Stone’s work on “regime
theory”—are probably familiar to most local government law
scholars.66
But there is not much local government law work, theoretical or
empirical, discussing interest group formation, voting behavior, or
positive political theory analyzing legislative or bureaucratic behavior
inside local governments. Such moves are so dominant in political
science that they spurred the well-known “Perestroika” movement to
push back against the heavy use of rational choice models, statistical
methods, and game theory.67 But local government law has been—
again with some exceptions—largely immune to this way of thinking.
One would think using tools that try to predict and explain how
differing political arrangements will change the behavior of office
holders would be natural in a field that focuses on the comparative
capacity of different political institutions to solve policy problems.68
Indeed, it is not as if these scholarly ideas have not made their way
into law schools. The use of positive political theory, game theory,
and structural models of legislatures that assume they consist of
rationally-maximizing politicians has remade the fields of statutory
interpretation and administrative law and has even made serious
inroads into constitutional law theory.69

66. See STONE, supra note 8.
67. See Catarina Kinnvall, Not Here, Not Now!: The Absence of a European
Perestroika Movement, in PERESTROIKA!: THE RAUCOUS REBELLION IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE 21 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 2005) (describing the movement).
68. See BAKER & GILLETTE, supra note 57, at 1 (“The study of local government
law, therefore, necessarily requires that we consider which level of government
should exercise a particular power and which limits we want to place on any given
level of government. A course in local government law, in short, is in large part a
course in institutional competence and institutional design.”).
69. See sources cited supra note 11.
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Some blame for this can be pointed at the field’s closest sister
discipline, the urban politics sub-field in political science. Unlike the
rest of the field, urban politics has remained somewhat immune to
rational choice scholarship and empirical methods. In a well-known
piece, Joshua Sapotichne, Bryan Jones and Michelle Wolfe asked, Is
Urban Politics a Black Hole? Their answer was yes.70 They argued
that political science scholarship about urban politics was neither
influenced much by, nor had much influence in, mainstream political
science.71 Urban politics is dominated by Stone’s regime theory
approach, a largely descriptive theory that suggests cities are
governed by “regimes” of businesses and local government officials
who work together to assemble the power to govern.72 As it is neither
predictive nor easily generalizable, regime theory is not much used
outside the subfield of urban politics.73 Questions of interest in much
of the rest of contemporary political science, ranging from the
importance of agenda setting and game theoretic interactions
between legislatures to empirical studies of voting behavior and
influence and the like, have not much influenced urban politics
scholarship.
Blame can also be pointed at scholars using public choice or
rational choice models in political science and economics more
generally for not paying much attention to local (and state) politics.
Rick Hills wrote that public choice scholarship on federalism and
localism “is voluminous in size but narrow in focus.”74 Public choice
scholarship focuses almost entirely on mobility between jurisdictions,
but little of it looks at “how political activity by voters or politicians in
federal regimes differs from unitary states’ politics. The literature, in
other words, focuses on exit, not voice.”75 There is, of course,
70. Id.
71. Sapochine et al., supra note 10, at 76.
72. Id. at 81. “Regime analysis views power as fragmented and regimes as the
collaborative arrangements through which local governments and private actors
assemble the capacity to govern. The primary reason for the fragmentation of power
is the division of labor between market and state.” Karen Mossberger & Gerry
Stoker, The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory: The Challenge of
Conceptualization, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 810, 812 (2001).
73. Regime theory, as Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker note, is “more a
concept or a model rather than a theory because it has limited ability to explain or
predict variation in regime formation, maintenance, or change.” Mossberger &
Stoker, supra note 72, at 811.
74. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 207 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
75. Id.
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excellent rational choice and empirical work on how local and state
politics differ from national politics, aside from the potential for exit.
Some pieces that immediately come to mind include Elinor Ostrom’s
Nobel Prize-winning scholarship on how local commons are
governed, Susan Rose-Ackerman’s work on why laboratories of
democracy are less innovative than one would think, Bill Fischel’s
Homevoter Hypothesis, and Eric Oliver’s work on how jurisdiction’s
size and demography affect political and civic behavior.76 But as Hills
notes, this is not the major focus of the literature.77 Studies of voting
behavior are not much better: most political scientists studying voter
choice focus on national or at least state politics, although there have
been a few neat recent papers looking at voter behavior in local
elections.78
The absence of modern methods in the urban politics subfield
should be an opportunity for local government law scholars. There is
much territory to cover, in discussing both the use and limits of these
tools.
Some truly exceptional scholarship has seized on this
opportunity. Early in the field’s development, Frank Michelman
famously compared public choice and public interest explanations for
a variety of cases.79 More recently, Lynn Baker, Clay Gillette, Rick
Hills, and Dan Rodriguez have used public choice and positive
political theory more generally to discuss issues as disparate as how
local initiatives and referenda work,80 the operation of Dillon’s Rule,81
76. See FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 6–14; ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA
29–32 (2001); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking
and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594
(1980).
77. Hills, supra note 74, at 207.
78. Recently, there have been a few excellent studies of the determinants of local
voting in Mayoral and other races in recent years. See, e.g., KAREN KAUFMANN, THE
URBAN VOTER: GROUP CONFLICT AND MAYORAL VOTING BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN
CITIES (2004); R. Douglas Arnold & Nicholas Carnes, Holding Mayors Accountable:
New York’s Executives from Koch to Bloomberg, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 949 (2012);
Cheryl Boudreau et al., Lost in Space?: Shortcuts and Spatial Voting in LowInformation Elections (UC Davis Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 328, March 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232371.
79. See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community SelfDetermination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53
IND. L.J. 145, 187 (1977).
80. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation and Collective
Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988).
81. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or Can
Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959
(1991).
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the dynamics of state and local and federal interactions,82 inter-local
contracts,83 and how courts should address local government efforts at
redistribution.84 I have used these tools to write about how election
laws inhibit electoral competition at the state and local levels based
on a model of party behavior,85 and (with Rick Hills) how cycling
preferences and distributive politics norms in local legislatures in the
absence of parties can produce excessively restrictive land use
policies.86 Outside the narrow tribe of local government law scholars,
Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy have usefully revisited RoseAckerman’s work on local policy innovation,87 and Gerald Gamm and
Thad Kousser have done fascinating work on how competition in
state legislatures explain variation in the number of district bills and
special legislation.88
As the last paragraph showed, public choice has been used to
analyze behavior of groups inside cities, game theory to understand
the interaction between cities, and positive political theory to
understand the behavior of legislators, political parties, and voters
inside cities. These tools do not hold the same place in the field of
local government law as they do in other fields of public law, from
statutory interpretation to administrative law, and their potential
utility should be quite clear.

82. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination, 67 CHI.KENT L. REV. 707 (1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism?
The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005).
83. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J. L. &
POL. 365, 367–69 (2005). See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and
Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001).
84. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and
Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1057 (2007); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism
and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State
Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243 (2011).
85. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 419–22 (2007).
86. See Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1672–76; see also Roderick J. Hills, Jr. &
David Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget”, (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 11-18, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1816368.
87. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1347–60 (2009).
88. See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, Parties and Pork: Historical Evidence
from the American States, 22–26 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Meeting Paper 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900816 (finding that polarized parties bias
statewide spending towards their constituents). See generally Gerald Gamm & Thad
Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical Patterns in American State
Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151 (2010).
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When we propose (or oppose) the creation of certain forms of
regional governments, suggest power be shifted among actors inside
cities, or discuss the power of certain groups inside existing local
governments, we ought to note that there is extensive literature
discussing when and under what conditions these changes will
promote certain democratic advantages (and disadvantages) like
party competition or distributive pork-barrel politics.
Local
government law is full of such proposals, and they would be far
stronger and more convincing if they were grounded in clear
assumptions about political behavior. In addition, they would be
more easily understood by political scientists and policy-makers.
Again, as with its engagement with economics, the problem local
government law faces is keeping up with the fast changing and often
extremely technical nature of modern political science. But it is
important that we do so. In order to understand how local politicians
use or are limited by the formal powers of local governments, we
need models for understanding their incentives and behavior. These
models have proven extremely powerful when they have been used,
allowing legal scholars to provide explanations regarding what legal
impediments stand in the way of local governments working together
on problems at the regional level,89 or how land use procedures serve
to limit the creation of affordable housing.90 There is great potential
for other applications of this type of research.
III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW’S “LAW AND ___” PROBLEM
MORE GENERALLY: LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The previous two sections discussed how local government law
scholarship has not kept up with new work in economics and political
science. The same is true with respect to other types of social science
and law.
Take criminal law and criminology. A whole series of scholars
have argued that a myriad of crime and justice problems—excessively
harsh penalties, reduced police presence in high crime areas, mass

89. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 190, 190–96 (2001) (arguing that impediments to enforcing inter-local
contracts—and not coordination problems among local governments—stand in the
way of inter-local approaches to regional problems).
90. See Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1674–78 (arguing that the absence of parties
and strategic interaction between local legislators has led to excessive restrictions on
housing supply).
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incarceration, and even limits on our ability to remove dangerous
teens from high-crime situations—are rooted in what are properly
understood as local government law problems. In his final works, the
late, great Bill Stuntz tried to explain why we rely far more on harsh
punishments rather than extra policing as a method of crime control,
even though all evidence points to the greater efficiency of spending
marginal dollars on police.91 He argued that since police officers are
being paid out of local government’s own source funding, while the
costs of imprisonment are born by the state, American cities have few
police officers and excessively harsh punishments.92
Further, Stuntz argues that district attorneys have become
increasingly willing to punish severely because crime has localized,
with a huge share of crime taking place in a small number of
neighborhoods.93 For much of the twentieth century, crime spread
through jurisdictions, such that victims, offenders, and the
populations that produced them were part of a district attorney’s
electoral calculus.94 As crime has localized, an increasingly large
number of county voters have begun to see crime as a distant,
although terrifying, problem.95 This has led to wild swings between
lenity and severity in punishment, as policies chase preferences
formed by casual viewings of the evening news rather than lived
experience.96 One way to look at Stuntz’s argument is that local
government law—the way local government revenue is raised as well
as jurisdiction size and shape—bears substantial blame for the size of
America’s crime and prison problems. 97

91. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 5–6 (2011); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE:
NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 108–17 (2012)
(discussing the efficacy of an increased numbers of police). See generally William J.
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1997-2040 (2008).
92. See Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 91, at 2014–16.
93. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 6.
94. See id. at 5–8.
95. Id. at 4–8.
96. Id. at 36.
97. The relationship between crime’s location and jurisdictional shape can also
tell us things about why policing inside local governments may not be optimal either.
Both Frank Zimring and a Department of Justice report by top academic
criminologists have found that “hot spot” policing in high crime areas reduced crime
overall. ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., POLICE PROGRAMS TO PREVENT CRIME IN HOT
SPOT AREAS, 4–14 (2012), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/
041218459_CPRS7_Crime_Hot_Spots.pdf. However, in large jurisdictions with
highly localized “hot spots,” it takes only a small extension from Stuntz’s argument to
note that we may see less of this type of policing than is optimal for reducing the
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Local government law has also been implicated in efforts at
innovative crime fighting policy. Mark Kleiman, a leading crime
policy scholar, has argued that separating political authority has
limited governments’ ability to pass some promising crime reduction
strategies.98 For instance, starting the school day later, or just keeping
the school open so that that teens are not out of school before most
parents return home, has been found to be a very effective technique
for reducing teen crime.99 But, at least in cities without mayoral
control over the schools, the officials held accountable for crime have
no control over the schools, and school officials care little about the
crime rate. Kleiman tells similar stories about other possible crime
reduction strategies that could be enacted by educational and public
health professionals.100 These arguments are about how local
government law creates organization structures inside cities and the
effect that has on crime fighting. One would think, based on work by
Stuntz, Kleiman, and Frank Zimring, who bring issues like this to the
forefront, that local government law scholars would find in
criminology and criminal law a fertile base for thinking about local
government law more generally. But aside from Nicole Garnett and
her fantastic work on the interface between land use and criminal law
in this area, which both uses and critiques criminological theories, this
is not a major feature of local government law study.101
Moreover, it is not just criminology and criminal law. Recently,
there has been an uptick in the study of the “science of cities.”
Several schools have been formed to do this and companies have

overall crime rate, because it involves removing police from where the large majority
of people live to send them to high crime areas.
98. MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS
CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 121–26 (2009).
99. Id. at 123–126.
100. Id.
101. See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING,
AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing
the Urban Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995, (2012); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The
Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land Use Policy, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 131 (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 43 (2012). Bob Ellickson has also explored the relationship between land use
and street misconduct. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in
City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J.
1165 (1996); see also James M. Anderson et al., Reducing Crime by Shaping the Built
Environment with Zoning: An Empirical Study of Los Angeles, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
699 (2011) (testing several theories about the interaction between zoning and crime
rates).
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invested heavily in developing “smart” technologies for cities.102
Rather than being a specific field of study, this approach uses the very
large data sets that local governments can produce (and suggests the
creation of even more, from using sensors to study traffic to infrared
monitoring of city buildings to study energy use) to make predictions
and policy recommendations.103 Although “smart city” approaches
seem to cover much of the gauntlet of urban policy, there do not
appear to be any such efforts to use them to study the effect of local
laws and legal innovation. Legal scholars have not helped. While
empirical legal studies have become a major part of the landscape of
legal scholarship, it has barely touched the field of local government
law.

102. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab has a project called
“City Science,” that uses big data sets and “urban analytics” to study urban planning,
and suggests that predictive analytics can improve local policy. Why Cities?, MASS.
INST. TECH., http://cities.media.mit.edu/about/cities (last visited Aug. 11, 2013). New
York University’s Center for Urban Science and Progress
will instrument New York City and use existing data from a network of
agencies to transform the city into a living laboratory and classroom. It will
make sense of the vast amount of data it collects to help cities around the
world become more productive, more livable, more equitable, and more
resilient.
About CUSP, CENTER FOR URB. SCI. PROGRESS, http://cusp.nyu.edu/about/ (last
visited Sept. 6, 2013). In so doing, it seeks to “set the research agenda for ‘the science
of cities.’” How and Why CUSP Came to Be, CENTER FOR URB. SCI. PROGRESS,
http://cusp.nyu.edu/about-how/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). IBM has developed a
business called “Smarter Cities” to propose data-driven consulting services to cities
around the world to improve everything from police services to education to urban
planning. Smarter Cities, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/smarter_
cities/overview/index.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
103. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology City Science project defines the
concept in the following way:
In the future, cities will account for nearly 90% of global population
growth, 80% of wealth creation, and 60% of total energy consumption.
Developing better strategies for the creation of new cities is therefore a
global imperative.
Our need to improve our understanding of cities, however, is pressed not
only by the social relevance of urban environments, but also by the
availability of new strategies for city-scale interventions that are enabled by
emerging technologies. Leveraging advances in data analysis, sensor
technologies, and urban experiments, City Science will provide new insights
into creating a data-driven approach to urban design and planning. To build
the cities that the world needs, we need a scientific understanding of cities
that considers our built environments and the people who inhabit them.
Our future cities will desperately need such understanding.
Why Cities?, supra note 103; see Smarter Cities, supra note 103 (defining smart city
projects in many areas).
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Why haven’t we kept up? I’m not sure. Perhaps it’s the heavy
theoretical orientation of the field, which, while it provides interesting
insights, has made scholars less interested in recent developments in
the social sciences. Perhaps it’s happenstance. Regardless, there is
no barrier to local government law scholars supplementing traditional
approaches with the use of more contemporary social science
methodologies, as recent work discussing agglomeration economics
and the law has shown. To the extent we want the field to be relevant
in the broader world of legal scholarship, we will have to, as it will be
harder and harder to convince the multidisciplinary scholars in other
fields to take the study of local government law seriously if it is not
rooted in the best contemporary social science. More importantly, we
will have to if we want other scholars and government officials to take
seriously the import of law and legal process to state and local policy.
Local government scholars argue that local government law is
crucially important to the future of cities. But it will be hard to make
these claims particularly convincing to other scholars or to policymakers if the field remains inward looking and ignores the best
research from other fields.
The topic of this symposium—the Fortieth anniversary of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal—may provide us with a way out.
Focusing on “urban law” rather than “local government law” suggests
a focus on places—specifically dense agglomerations of people in
urban areas—rather than on formal governmental institutions. The
flaws in local government law discussed above derive largely from a
type of formalism, a focus on the formal powers of local governments
rather than the behavior of local politicians, a focus on the way
formal local boundaries drive individual locational choices rather
than informal economic and social relations do. Thinking of
ourselves as urban law scholars as well as local governmental law
scholars may encourage us to look at these non-governmental, nonformal forces that drive what actually happens in our cities. For this,
and many other reasons, I look forward to reading the next forty
years of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.

